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RECENT DECISIONS
ADMIRALTY-LIABILITY OF GENERAL AGENT OF THE GOVERNMENT TO SHIP'S COM-

PLEMENT-Plaintiff while employed as an engineer on a ship contracted poliomelitis
and was permanently injured allegedly due to the negligence of the master and officers
of the vessel in taking precautions and in failing to furnish proper treatment. His
complaint alleged that the defendant shipping company "managed, operated and controlled" the ship under a standard form of General Agency Agreement with its
owner, the United States Government, and that the negligent master and officers were
"agents, servants and employees" of the defendant. The plaintiff obtained judgment
in the District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon further appeal, held,
four Justices dissenting, judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that
the Government had retained control of the ship's complement to the exclusion of the
defendant general agent and the latter was not the employer of the plaintiff. Cosmopolitan Shipping Company, Inc. v. McAllister, 337 U. S. 783 (1949).
In a common law action a seaman injured in the service of his ship was entitled to
wages, maintenance and cure at the expense of the owner of the vessel; he was not,
however, entitled to compensatory damages save in the exceptional cases of unseaworthiness or negligence in medical treatment. 1 Even in these cases, the seaman's
suit for full indemnity was only obtainable in admiralty without a jury. The Jones
Act 2 extended the rights of the injured seaman against his employer by authorizing
a negligence action for damages at law in which more lenient rules would apply.a
Later the Clarification Act 4 was passed which attempted to secure to seamen employed
by the United States through the War Shipping Administration the same protections
as were afforded seamen employed on privately owned and operated American vessels.
Where the suit is against the United States, however, the seaman must proceed under
the Suits in Admiralty Act, 5 but if the shipping company (here the general agent) is
the employer, then the seaman can bring himself within the protection of the Jones
Act and is not relegated to a suit in admiralty under the Suits in Admiralty Act. The
important question, therefore is: who is the seaman's employer? To put the question
another way: is a private corporation, operating a vessel as an agent of the United
States Government under the Standard form of agency agreement, liable to a seaman
for torts committed by the officers and crew of that vessel?
This question has been considered on several occasions by the United States Supreme Court, but the results have been varying and seemingly inconclusive. In
1. Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375 (1924). The shipowner was not
responsible for injuries to a seaman occasioned by the negligence of members of the crew
or the ship's officers. Id. at 377.
2.

TEm MERCHANT MARINE ACT OF 1920; 41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 688 (1948).

3. These rules were taken from the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35 STAT. 65 (1908),
45 U. S. C. § 51 et seq. (1948), and include an abandonment of the assumption of risk and
fellow servant rules and an adoption of the doctrine of comparative negligence-all of
which, of course, works for the benefit of the seaman. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Co.
v. Richardson, 313 U. S. 574 (1940); Great Northern Railway v. Leonidas, 305 U. S. 1
(1938).
4. THE WAR SmPPING ADminmSTRATioN (CLARiFIcATiON) ACT OF 1943; 57 STAT. 45
(1943), 50 U. S. C. § 1291 (1948).
5. SUITS IN ADMIRALTY ACT By OR AGAINST VESSELS OR CARGOES OF UNITED STATES; 41
STAT. 525 (1920), 46 U. S. C. §§ 741 to 752 (1948).
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United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporationv. Lustgartc, 0 the court
decided that the seaman's action lay only against the government and that he had
no remedy as against the agent. However, in Brady v. Roosevelt S.. Co.,J the plaintiff's injury occurred as a result of the agent's own negligence and not as a result of
any negligence on the part of the master or crew, and, consequently, the court held
the agent responsible for the injury. Although the Brady case involved a question
quite distinct from that in the Lustgarten case, the Supreme Court in Hust v. MooreMcCormack Linws8 considered it as overruling the latter case and as deciding that the
general agent is the real employer, even though the seaman might be "technically"
employed by the government. The Court in the Hust case also interpreted the first
section of the Clarification Act as allowing seamen, injured prior to the enactment of that statute, an election between a suit against the government in admiralty
and one against the agent at law. It was said that a seaman on a vessel owned
by the government and operated under a general agency agreement always had,
and continued to have, a right to sue the agent. Nor could Caldarola v. Eckert &
Co., 9 be considered to have disturbed the Hust decision for it was concerned solely
with the agent's liability to a stevedore. There the court said: "We there [i.e., in the
Hust case] held that under the Agency contract the Agent was the 'employer' of an
injured seaman as that term is used in the Jones Act.... The Court did not hold that
the Agency contract... imposed upon him, as a matter of federal law, duties of care
to third persons, more particularly to a stevedore. . . .,,o
The facts of the Hust case are virtually indistinguishable from those in the instant case. The only discernible difference is that the injury to Hust occurred before
the enactment of the Clarification Act while the injury to the plaintiff here was subsequent to that Act. Neither appellate court in the instailt case could find in that
difference any basis for distinguishing the cases." But the majority of the Supreme
Court did argue that the holding of the Hust case was unsound on two grounds: first,
in holding that the decision in the Brady case reversed the Lustgartcn decision, and
thereby giving to seamen the right to sue general agents under the Jones Act for torts
committed by masters and crew, for the simple reason that the Brady case dealt only
with the seaman's right to sue the agent for the agent's own torts; second, in holding
that the Clarification Act reinforced the alleged right of the seaman to sue the agent
under the Jones Act, because the Clarification Act merely extended to seamen employed by the War Shipping Administration rights then enjoyed by privately employed
seamen. The Clarification Act did not give to these employees of the government
rights as against anyone other than their employer. Thus the injured seaman may
recover only against his employer and this right is unaffected by the Clarification Act.
The decision reached by the Court in the principal case clearly required a reversal
of the Hust decision and the Court did not hesitate to do so.
The Court announced that it would liberally construe the term "employee" so as
to accomplish the beneficient purposes of the Jones Act without disregarding the
plain and ordinarily accepted meaning of the relationship between employer and
employee.12 Much weight was given to the contract between the defendant and the
6.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

280 U. S. 320 (1929).

317 U. S. 575 (1943).
328 U. S. 707 (1946).
332 U. S. 155 (1947).
Id. at 159.
337 U. S. 783, 787 (1949) ; 169 F. 2d 4, 8 (2d Cir. 1948).
12. Id. at 791.
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United States. The court declared: "An examination of the terms of that contract
demonstrates that the United States had retained for the entire voyage the possession,
management, and navigation of the vessel and control of the ship's officers and crew
to the exclusion of the general agent."' 3 The majority concluded from this that the
government, and not the agent, was the employer. This conclusion is strengthened
by the fact that though the officers and men were procured by the general agent
through the usual channels, they were paid by, and were subject to the orders of,
the United States; that the United States, through the master of the ship, retained
full control of them and the physical operation of the vessel; and that the shipping
articles, including those the plaintiff in this case signed, were stamped: "You Are Being
Employed By The United States." The responsibility of the general agent, on the
other hand, was that of a ship's husband, including the duty to "equip, victual, supply
and maintain the vessel, subject to such directions, orders . . . as the United States
14
may from time to time prescribe."'
The reasoning upon which this decision is based appears to be sound and reaches
a desirable result. This is so particularly in view of the fact that it seems to have
been the intent of the government, in its general agency agreements, to indemnify the
agent for personal injury suits against him by the crew.10 The result of the decision
is to make agents, such as the defendant, immune from suits by seamen injured during
the course of a voyage due to the negligence of the master or crew. The holding
is equally applicable to any other action which a seaman might bring that depends on
the existence of an employer-employee relationship.'( In all such cases, the seaman's
exclusive remedy is against the United States. The general agency agreement, especially
the indemnifying clause noted above, gives evidence that this was in the contemplation of both parties to the agreement. Moreover, it is important that the United
States be considered as being in possession and control of the vessels operating under
the War Shipping Administration because it is by virtue of this government possession that these ships are immune from many restrictions applicable to private vessels,
both in foreign ports and at home, and are thus enabled to expedite their important
7
work.1
How does the majority opinion in the principal case affect the rights of seamen?
The court remarked that seamen would enjoy substantially the same rights whether
the government or the general agent was considered to be his employer. The
Clarification Act provides that the seaman's action against the government must be
brought under the Suits in Admiralty Act which means a suit in admiralty without
the jury which would sit in an action under the Jones Act. Moreover, the shorter
statute of limitations, two years, under the Suits in Admiralty Act,' 8 now replaces
the three year period given to seamen under the Jones Act.' 9 This may work hardship on seamen who have delayed bringing their suit in reliance on the three year
limitation under the Jones Act. Another possible detriment to the seaman is that
there are indications that the decision in the Brady case may still be the law so
that seamen must now predict in doubtful cases whether the injury will be held to
13. Id. at 795.
14. Art. 2 of the general agency agreement.
15.
16.
17.

332 U. S. 155, 167 (1947).
328 U. S. 707, 719 (1946).
332 U. S. 155, 159 (1947).

18. See note 5, supra.
19. The statutory limitation for actions under the Jones Act is governed by an amendment to the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 2 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U. S. C. § 56 (1948).
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be due to the agent's own negligence or that of the master or crew. If the former,
he may sue the agent at law; if the latter, he nust sue in admiralty. This difficulty
has its practical solution in filing two suits as the court observed in the Hust case.
But it is possible that this division of remedies might also result in loss of relief
altogether.20
The rights of seamen have undergone important modification by reason of the majority holding in the instant case. Although the court in the Hnst case observed that
the rights of seamen were so settled that only the legislature could disturb them,2 1
the bare majority of the Court in the principal case entertain a different view. In any
event, this vacillation is clearly undesirable. Nevertheless, the inherent soundness in
reasoning of the majority opinion in the McAllister case should compel its acceptance
as finally settling the law on the liability of a general agent of the government to a
ship's complement.2

PATENTS-REQUIREMENTS

FOR PATENTABITTY-STANDARDS

OF INvENTION-Plain-

tiff, owner of a patent on a drapery hanger, brought an action for infringement of two
claims under this patent. The defenses of invalidity and non-infringement were set
up by the defendant. The trial court found plaintiff's hanger was novel and useful
but declared the two claims in question invalid for lack of invention on the ground of
the absence of a "flash of genius". On appeal, held, reversed on the ground that the
test for invention is a display of more ingenuity than a workman skilled in his line
of work possesses. Falkenberg v. Bernard Edward Co., 175 F. 2d 427 (7th Cir. 1949).
The decision in the principal case, like many others, involves the effect to be
given by the courts to the "flash of creative genius" test of inventiveness announced
in Cuno Engineering Corporation,v. Automatic Devices Corporation,' previously discussed and critically analysed by this Review.2
The immediate reaction to the decision in the Cuno case was sharp and divided.
Many courts interpreted the decision as setting a new subjective standard for invention.3 In Picard v. United Aircraft Corp.4 the court recognized a "new doctrinal
trend" in the Supreme Court's "increasing disposition to raise the standard of originality necessary for a patent". In Potts v. Coc,5 the "flash of genius" expression
was held to indicate that more emphasis was to be placed on individual achievements
rather than on the qualities of the production in determining patentability. In Ander20. 328 U. S. 707, 721 (1946). It seems that a seaman might be rebuffed at law on the
ground that his suit should have been brought in admiralty, and in admiralty on the ground
that his suit should have been brought at law.
21. Id. at 722.
22. Allen v. Boland et al., 94 N.Y. S. 2d 81 (Sup. CL 1949).

1. 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941).
2. 13 FoRD. L. REV. 84 (1944).
3. Potts v. Coe, 145 F. 2d 27 (D. C. Cir. 1944) ; Kaufmann & Co. v. Leitman, 131 F. 2d
308 (2d Cir. 1942) ; Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F. 2d 632 (2d Cir. 1942) ; Anderson
Co. v. Lion Products Co., 127 F. 2d 454 (1st Cir. 1942); Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co. v.
Kar Engineering Co., 59 F. Supp. 820 (Mass. 1945); Wolf Bros. v. Equitable Paper Bag
Co., 55 F. Supp. 832 (E. D. N.Y. 1943).
4. 128 F. 2d 632, 636 (2d Cir. 1942).
5. 145 F. 2d 27 (D. C. Cir. 1944).
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son Co. v. Lion Products Co.6 the court held that invention cannot be claimed "unless
the patentee can show by his achievement that spark of ingenuity which distinguishes
invention from mere improvement."
Other courts, 7 however, refused to acknowledge any change in the standard of
invention established in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,8 i.e., a display of "more ingenuity
and skill . . . than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the
business." In Chicago Steel Foundry Co. v. Burnside Steel Foundry Co.0 the court
objected to inquiry into the quality of an inventor's mind or the nature of his mental
activity in determining patentability, and rejected "flash of genius" as a test "not
only because it is incapable of acceptable definition but because it injects into the
statute something not appearing therein." In 1Broun & Sharpe Mfg. Co. v. Kar
Engineering Co.' 0 the court questioned whether the phrase had added a higher test
of invention and concluded that the Supreme Court opinion in the Cuno case was
merely a restatement of the classic test. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
in the case of In re Shortell" held that the term "flash of creative genius" was intended to mean "nothing more than that the thing patented must involve more than
the skill of the art to which it relates". This court refused to recognize any new
doctrinal trend as to the tests of invention, and held that it was not within the
province of the courts to establish new standards for determining invention.
The later decisions of the Supreme Court, though fully aware of the conflict
arising in the various Circuits and the basic problem provoked by its holding in the
Cuno case, have not succeeded in clearing up the resulting confusion. In Sinclair &
Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp.,'2 the court cited the Cuno decision but significantly
avoided any mention of "flash of genius". In stating that the patent system was "not
concerned with the quality of the inventor's mind, but with the quality of his
product",' 3 the court appeared to reject the subjective test for invention implicit in
its earlier decision. 14 However, a more recent decision of the Supreme Court in
Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co.' 5 hews close to the reasoning of the Cuno decision,
6. 127 F.2d 454, 457 (1st Cir. 1942).
7. See Trabon Enigineering Corp. v. Dirkes et al., 136 F. 2d 24, 27 (6th Cir. 1943) whero
the court in discussing the flash of genius concept stated: "We do not interpret the observation as indicating anything more significant than that the quality of invention is 'something more' than expected mechanical skill."
8. 11 How. 248, 266 (U.S. 1850).
9. 132 F. 2d 812, 818 (7th Cir. 1943).
10. 154 F. 2d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 822 (1946).
11. 142 F. 2d 292, 295 (C. C. P. A. 1944).
12. 325 U.S. 327 (1945).
13. "A long line of cases has held it to be an essential requirement for the validity of a
patent that the subject-matter display 'invention', 'more ingenuity . . . than the work of a
mechanic skilled in the art'. . . . This test is often difficult to apply; but its purpose is
dear. Under this test, some substantial innovation is necessary, an innovation for which
society is truly indebted to the efforts of the patentee. Whether or not those efforts are
of a special kind does not concern us." Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325
U.S. 327, 330 (1945).
14. In Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co. v. Kar Engineering Co., 154 F. 2d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 1946)
the court considered that the opinion in the Sinclair case "establishes conclusively that the
Supreme Court has wrought no change in the classic test for invention-that there is no
need to find a 'flash of creative genius' on the part of a patentee to sustain his patent....
15. 335 U.S. 560, 566 (1949).
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and, citing that decision, holds a patent invalid where there "was not an exemplification of inventive genius such as is necessary to render the patent valid". In Graver
Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.,16 the Supreme Court indicates that
patentable discovery is to be measured "by the standards announced by this court
in Cuno Eugineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp."
The present wide divergence in interpretation of the Cunw standard, more than
eight years after the decision, is best illustrated by a comparison of the opinion of
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in the instant case with the recent opinion of
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Alemite Co. v. Jiffy Lubricator Co.17 In the
instant case the court stated that "the trial court ... erred in construing the phrase,
'flash of genius', as adding a test for invention of a higher degree or superior to that
which would have produced patentable invention under the law as it existed prior to
the date of the Cuno decision."' 8 In the Alemitc case the court held that its statements in a 1936 case' 9 "must be considered in the light of more recent decisions of
the Supreme Court raising the standards of originality necessary to sustain a patent",2
and the Cuno, Jungersen, and Mandel Bros. v. Wallace 2 cases were cited as exemplifying the new attitude toward patentability. Other recent decisions point up this continuing conflict in the courts between adherence to the traditional standards of invention
on one hand, 22 and recognition of higher, more subjective, standards on the other.P
Whether higher standards of invention are desirable in the American patent system
today is an actively debated subject.2 4 It is argued by many that the classic test is
sufficiently flexible to be still applicable in the present state of technological advancement.2 There is legislation pending in Congress which if enacted would settle the
16. 336 U.S. 271, 2S1 (1949).
17. 176 F. 2d 444 (Sth Cir. 1949).
18. Falkenberg v. Bernard Edward Co., 175 F. 2d 427, 428 (7th Cir. 1949).
19. Stewart-Warner Corp. v. Jiffy Lubricator Co.,'81 F. 2d 786 (8th Cir. 1936).
20. 176 F. 2d 444, 448 (Sth Cir. 1949).
21. 335 U.S. 291 (1948).
22. In Robertson Rock Bit Co. v. Hughes Tool Co., 176 F. 2d 783, 790 (5th Cir. 1949),
the court presents the traditional view, stating, "It is true that the combination must represent something more than the ordinary skill of the average mechanic, but, speaking prosaically rather than poetically, it is not true, as is sometimes claimed, that patents to be
valid must be the result of, must embody, flashes of genius .... The 'any person who has
invented or discovered' etc. of Revised Statute, Sec. 4886, ...is intended to mean something more than the mere display 'by an ordinary mechanic' of mechanical aptitude. It
means no more, though, than that when confronted with a combination producing a materially different or more advantageous result, one must examine the particular change made
in the light of the art at the time the device was developed to determine whether inventive
skill produced the change or whether only mechanical aptitude was responsible." See also
Smith v. Kingsland, 82 U. S. P. Q. 353, 355 (D. C. Cir. 1949).
23. In Miller v. Tilley, 178 F. 2d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1949) the court e.xpr-sly recognizes
higher standards, stating, "The standards of originality necessary to sustain a patent have
in recent years been raised." See also Gomez v. Granat Bros., 177 F. 2d 266, 26S (9th Cir.
1949); Koochook Co. v. Barrett, 158 F. 2d 463 (Sth Cir. 1946); Reynolds v. Emaus, 83
U.S. P.Q. 510 (D. Mich. 1949).
24. See Cooper, Challenging the Court's View of "Invention", 35 A.B.A. J. 306 (1949)
and Kenyon, Why Challenge the Court's View of "Invention"?, 35 A.B. A. 3. 4SO (1949).
25. In Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co. v. Kar Engineering Co., 154 F. 2d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 1946)
the court states: "To us this [the increase in patents held invalid by Supreme Court in
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controversy in favor of the traditional test. 20 Also, a codification of the traditional
standard of invention, with express provision that the test shall be objective rather
than subjective, is contained in the preliminary draft of the proposed revision of the
laws, drawn by the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Represenpatent 27
tatives.
It is submitted that even in the absence of such clarifying statutes, the courts are
justified in applying the traditional standards as the appellate court did in the instant
case. Those courts ruling patents invalid, with modifying statements, "Under the state
of the law as it formerly existed, these elements would probably combine to produce
patentable invention", 28 or "If it were not for Cuno .. .and the line of authority
which it has engendered ...I should ...have concluded that B. had made a patentable
invention", 20 are overestimating the powers of the judiciary. Whatever the underlying
intent of the court in the Cuno, Jungersen, and Mandel Bros. decisions may have been,
30
The
the opinions should be read merely as a restatement of the traditional test.
Supreme Court, having well settled the interpretation of the 1874 statute as to standards
of invention over a long period of years, cannot now elevate these standards by reinterpretation. If the threshold requirements of patentability are to be raised, or indeed changed at all, it should be solely the function of Congress to so change,

REAL PROPERTY-ESTATE TERMINABLE BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT-LIrE ESTATE OR
TENANCY AT WILL.-Husband and wife were married in 1922 and in August they
entered into a separation agreement, the terms of which were made a part of a
decree of divorce granted to the wife in October 1944. The pertinent paragraph of
the separation agreement read: "The second party agrees to release all of her right,
titles and interest in and to the house and lot owned by the parties hereto, jointly,..
but the party of the second part ... [is] to have the right and privilege of occupying said premises without paying any rent until it is otherwise mutually agreed by the
parties hereto." The husband died testate in 1946 leaving his entire estate to his
recent years] indicates no change in doctrine but instead points to recognition of the fact
that the classic test for invention, like the classic test for due care to which it is closely
analogous, must, like any standard for human conduct be applied in the environment of
today, not yesterday, and that today, due to the tremendous advance in technological knowledge and the wide dissemination of education, the general level of the capacity of those
skilled in the various arts is far higher than it used to be."
26. H. R. REP. No. 4798, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
27. PRoPosED REVIsION OF THn PATENT LAWS, Title 35, Sect. 31: "A patent may not be
obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described in the material specified
in section 22 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented
and said material are such ibat the subject matter as a whole would be obvious to an
ordinary person skilled in the art. Patentability as to this condition shall be determined
by the nature of the contribution to the advancement of the art, and not by the nature
of the mental processes by which such contribution may have been accomplished."
28. Falkenberg v. Bernard Edward Co., 79 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Ill. 1948), rev'd, 175 F. 2d
427 (7th Cir. 1949).
29. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co. v. Kar Engineering Co., 59 F. Supp. 820, 825 (Mass. 1945),
rev'd, 154 F. 2d 48 (1st Cir. 1946).
30. In Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co. v. Kar Engineering Co., 154 F. 2d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 1946)
the court noted that "later decisions of the Supreme Court indicate, we think unmistakably,
that all that was intended in the Cuno case was a restatement of the classic test."
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mother, except for legacies to each of his daughters. This action was brought by his
former wife to enforce against his estate her right to the property in question.
Plaintiff was awarded life use of the premises and the defendant, testator of the
husband, appealed from that part of the judgment awarding plaintiff life use of the
realty and ordering defendant to set aside funds for payment of taxes on the premises.
Held, judgment reversed on the ground that the agreement created a tenancy at will
which is personal in its nature, and terminates at the death of either party. Lcpsclh v.
Lepsclh, 275 App. Div. 412, 90 N. Y. S. 2d 157 (4th Dep't 1949).
A tenancy at will is an interest in property which is terminable at the will of the
grantor and of the grantee and which has no other designated period of duration.1
It is an estate of uncertain duration but differs from freehold interests in that it is
defeasible at the uncontrolled will of its creator.2
Estates which by their terms are to last only so long as both parties agree have
been classified as estates at will. In Say v. Stoddard3 the property in question vas
let "for so long as the parties shall mutually agree to continue the renting under this
agreement." 4 The estate would determine the moment either party so decided, and
1. N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 228 reads in part: "A tenancy at will or by sufferance, however created, may be terminated by a written notice of not less than thirty days given in
behalf of the landlord, to the tenant, requiring him to remove from the premises.... "
In 1 TiE'A_-r, RnEL PROPERTY § 155 (3d ed. 1939) the author defines a tenancy at wil
as "a tenancy which is terminable at the volition of either the landlord or the tenant.
2. 2 BL. CoA.r. *145; Burns v. Bryant, 31 N. Y. 453, 454 (1865); Pot v. Post, 14
Barb. 253, 258 (N.Y. 1852). Some conflict seems to have arisen as a result of Lord Coke's
statement that when a lease is made at the will of the lessee, the tenancy must alo be at
the will of the lessor. Co. Lrrr. *68. The case of Western Transportation Co. v. Lansing, 49 N.Y. 499 (1872) appears to follow the English authorities on this point but has been
distinguished and its application limited in later New York cases. Kolasky v. Michels, 120
N. Y. 635, 24 N. E. 278 (1890); Hoff v. Royal Metal Furniture Co., 117 App. Div. 884,
103 N. Y. Supp. 371 (2d Dep't 1907), aff'd, 189 N. Y. 555, 82 N. E. 1128 (1907). In
Effinger v. Lewis, 3Z Pa. 367, 370 (1859) the court stated that "an estate at the vill of the
grantee, his heirs and assigns, is equivalent to a fee simple, and such an estate could
not, by the old customs, be conveyed without livery of seisin. By the same customs, there
could be no livery of seisin under a lease, but a mere taking of possession. Land granted by
livery of seisin, without defining the quantity of the estate, was treated as a life estate.
Where there was merely a delivery of possession, without defining the term, there arose
only a tenancy at will. For want of livery of seisin, and the form of conveyance proper
to that ceremony, it was necessary to treat an estate at the vill of the grantee, as being
also at the will of the grantor, else a fee simple might be granted in a form that pertained
to the lowest order of estates; and this the customs of that day did not allow." (italics
supplied). The fact that old authorities turned upon the question of whether livery of seisin
had been made is occasionally overlooked. With livery of selsin no longer required, a lease
at the will of the lessee is a life tenancy, terminable at the option of the lessee. Lindlay v.
Raydure, 239 Fed. 928, 942 (D. C. Ky. 1917) ; Gunnison v. Evans, 136 Kan. 791, 18 P.2d
191 (1933); Ely v. Randall, 68 Minn. 177, 70 N.W. 9E0 (1897).
3. 27 Ohio St. 478 (1875).
4. Id. at 483. A further provision provided that "either party may put an end to this
" (italics in lease).
renting by giving the other party four days' notice, in writng....
In holding that the agreement created a tenancy at will, the court stated that "the character of the tenancy is not affected by the fact that four days' notice of its determination,
is provided for in the contract; for in a general tenancy at will, reasonable notice must be
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the tenant therefore was holding at the will of the lessor. Such an estate comes within
the strict definition of an estate at will and the court so held. A similar limitation
appeared in the case of Richardson v. Langridge.6 In that case the owner agreed to
let the premises "so long as both parties like." Holding that such an agreement
created a tenancy at will, the court said: "But if two parties agree that the one shall
let, and the other shall hold, so long as both please, that is a holding at will."8 The
instant case was held to be an estate at will on analogy to the Richardson case. The
court said: "Taking the words in their usual sense, it appears that the words 'until
it is otherwise mutually agreed by the parties hereto' would mean substantially the
same as an agreement that the property was to be held 'as long as both parties
please', which was construed to create a tenancy at will. . . .A fine line of distinction is often all that separates these estates at will from an
estate for life.8 While an estate for life may be expressly described as to duration
in terms of the life of one or more specified persons, the use of the term "life estate"
is not necessary 9 and the intention to create a life estate may be expressed in any
equivalent and appropriate language. 10 Such an estate will result whenever an interest is granted for an uncertain period, which is not inheritable, nor terminable at the
will of the grantor,and may last for a lifetime." So long as such an estate continues
it is governed by all the rules and principles of life estates and the uncertainty of
the duration of the estate or the probability of its being determined in a limited
number of years is immaterial so long as it is capable of enduring for the term of a
life.12
An estate which is terminable at the will of the grantee but not at the will of the
grantor has been held to be a life estate. In Sweetser v. McKenney, 18 the court construed an agreement to let the premises in question "for five years and as much longer
as he desires" as creating a life tenancy. The court held that the right of the lessee,
independent of the will of the lessor, to renew the lease indefinitely gave to him a
right of occupancy' 4 which is not to be defeated at the option of the lessor. This ingiven by the party whose will determines it, to the other party; and the contract here
fixes the length of that notice."
5. 4 Taunt. 128, 128 Eng. Rep. 277 (Com. P1. 1811).
6. Id. at 131, 128 Eng. Rep. at 278.
7. 275 App. Div. 412, 414, 90 N.Y.S.2d 157, 160 (4th Dep't 1949).
8. Life estates are classified, according to the manner in which they are created, Into
"conventional" life estates and "legal" life estates. 1 REEvES, REAL PROPERTY § 440 (1909).
Legal life estates are those created by operation of law. Knapp v. Knapp, 303 111. 535, 135
N. E. 732 (1922). Conventional life estates are those created by contract or convention of
the parties. I T=rANY, REA PROPERTY § 49 (3d ed. 1939).
9. Cross v. Hock, 149 Mo. 325, 50 S.W. 786 (1899).
10. Greenleaf v. Greenleaf, 332 Mo. 402, 58 S. W. 2d 448 (1933).
11. 1 TmNY RE, L PROPERTY § 49 (3d ed. 1939); Ely v. Randall, 68 Minn. 177, 70
N. W. 980 (1897); Disley v. Disley, 30 R. 1. 366, 75 Atl. 481 (1910).
12. In Ely v. Randall, 68 Minn. 177, 70 N. W. 980 (1897), the lessee occupied the
premises under a lease which provided that the lessee should hold for a term of five years,
with a privilege of renewal indefinitely. The lessee covenanted to keep a post office and a
store on the premises, and if at any time he should cease to do so, the lease was to terminate. The court held that it was a lease for life subject to the performance of the specified
conditions.
13. 65 Me. 225 (1875).
14. It has been said that the giving of a "right to occupy" creates only an incumbrance

1950]

RECENT DECISIONS

terest is of such an uncertain duration that it may last a lifetime and therefore was
held to be a life tenancy.
Substantially the same facts as in the principal case were presented in Disley v.
Disley.1 There the agreement stipulated that the plaintiff was to live on the premises
and make it a home for her sister, without becoming a tenant, "until further agreement between said parties". 10 In holding that the agreement created a life estate the
court said: "The expression 'life estate' is to be thought of as comprising a welldefined class of interests, some of which may not continue during any specified life
or lives, but all of which are freehold estates not of inheritance. Any estate that
may last for a life or lives, that is not inheritable and that is not at will, nor for
any fixed period of time, is placed in this category."' 7 The court reasoned that the
agreement could be terminated only by the happening of the specified event, i.e., a
further agreement between the parties. It did not depend upon the uncontrolled
will of the grantor.
It seems clear that the words of duration in the instant case, "until it is otherwise
mutually agreed by the parties" is equivalent, not to "so long as the parties shall
mutually agree", as appeared in the Richardson case, but to the phrase "until further
agreement between said parties" as existed in the Disley case. A fair reading of the
agreement in the principal case leads to the conclusion that termination and not
continuance of the interest of the wife was dependent upon mutual agreement; that,
in fact, the husband had no right to destroy that interest without the concurrence
of the wife. Yet an interest having such characteristics is, as noted before, a life
estate and not an estate at will.' 8

This view of the interest of the wife is given further support if we look to the
probable intent of the parties at the time of execution of the instrument creating
the estate. The court in its opinion stated but one of the characteristics of the estate
and not an estate for life. Matter of Reid, 165 Misc. 132, 300 N.Y. Supp. 124 (Surr. Ct.
1937); REsTATEMExT, PROPERTY, App. Chap. A g 24. But an examination of the cases so
holding shows that such a result was reached only because the grantor so intended. For
example, where an estate was granted to one person conditioned upon his permitting a
second person also to occupy the premises granted, the court found that the grantor did
not express an intention to grant to the second person an estate-only an incumbrance.
Matter of Reid, supra; Sayres v. Johannes, 116 Misc. 497, 1S0 N.Y. Supp. 247 (Sup. CL
1921); Franklin v. Ainertzhagen, 39 App. Div. 555, 57 N.Y. Supp. 401 (Ist Dep't 1899).
It was held to be an incumbrance because the grantor so intended and not because the
words "right and privilege of occupancy" were incompatible with the creation of a life
estate. In the instant case the provision granting "a right and privilege of occupancy until
mutually agreed otherwise" is the only provision of grant in the instrument and there is
nothing to indicate an intention to create a charge only.
15. 30 R.I. 366, 75 AUt. 481 (1910).
16. The court construed the words "without becoming a tenant" as having been used
in a broad and colloquial sense; as having had particular reference to the payment of rent;
and that it was the intent of the parties to create a tenancy of some kind.
17. 30 RI. 366, 370, 75 Atl. 481, 483 (1910).
18. It is evident that the trial court's order directing the defendant to set aside funds
for the payment of taxes is directly contrary to Matter of Albertson, 113 N. Y. 434, 439,
21 N. E. 117, 118 (1889) which stated the general rule that a tenant for life, since be
enjoys the rents and profits of the land, must pay the taxes and make ordinary, reasonable and necessary repairs required to preserve the property and prevent its going to decay
or waste, unless the instrument creating his tenancy expressly provides otherwise.
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at will, i.e., that it terminates with the death of the grantor.' 9 The more important
incident of an estate at will is that which has been stressed above, i.e., that it is
terminable at the will of the grantor at any time. In view of the fact that in the
same paragraph of the instrument which created her interest in the property, the
wife agreed to execute in favor of the husband a deed releasing her joint interest in
the property, it is reasonable to believe that the parties did not intend to create an
interest in the wife which the husband could destroy as soon as the agreement was
signed, by giving the statutory notice.

TORTS-RIGHT OF REPRESENTATIVE OF UNBORN CHILD TO RECOVER FOR PRENATAL
INJURIES INCURRED WHILE THE FOETUS WAS VIABLE.-Plaintiff, as administrator of

the estate of an unborn child, brought an action against defendant doctor and maternity hospital for the wrongful death of the unborn child. The complaint alleged
that the child would have been born alive if reasonable and prudent care had been
exercised by the defendants. On appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer to the
complaint, held, order reversed on the ground that the plaintiff has a right, under the

wrongful death statute, to recover for prenatal injuries incurred by a viable foetus
as a result of defendants' negligence notwithstanding the fact that the foetus did not
survive and was born dead. Verkennes v. Corneia et al., 38 N. W. 2d 838 (Minn.
1949).
Specifically the question in the instant case is whether or not the now scientifically
proven fact that at some time late in pregnancy the foetus is capable of an extrauterine existence destroys the effect of an almost unwavering line of cases which
denied to anyone a cause of action for injuries to a child before birth on the ground
that, for the purpose of such a suit, the child at the time of the injury was still a
part of its mother and not cognizable in the law as a potential plaintiff. The origin
of this line of cases is Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton.' In an opinion by
Justice Holmes the Massachusetts court announced that the representative of a child
born during the fourth or fifth month of pregnancy, due to its mother's falling down
a coal-hole, had no cause of action for the child's death because the child was not a
legal person capable of suing at the time of the injury. Furthermore the court was
reluctant to recognize a right without precedent. Until recently Amercan courts have
19. The court seems to take the position that the fact that the wife was given only
the "right and privilege" of occupancy without paying rent negates the possibility of the
creation of a life estate. Yet in the Disley case the agreement merely provided that the
plaintiff was to continue to live on the premises, without becoming a tenant, until further
agreement between the parties. The court there had no difficulty in finding a life tenancy.
There are no words of art necessary to the creation of a life estate and the intention to
create such an estate may be expressed in any appropriate language. N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW
§ 240 provides that: "Every instrument creating, transferring, assigning or surrendering
an estate or interest in real property must be construed according to the intent of the
parties, so far as such intent can be gathered from the whole instrument, and is consistent
with the rules of law." A conveyance which is of doubtful meaning will be construed
in favor of the grantee and against the grantor. Reed v. Lewis, 74 Ind. 433 (1881) ; Blackman v. Striker, 142 N. Y. 555, 560, 37 N. E. 484, 485 (1894) ; 1 TmrANY, REAL PROPERTY
§ 158 (3d ed. 1939).
1.

138 Mass. 14 (1884).
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generally followed this rule without regard to whether or not 2the foetus was viable
at the time of the injury or whether the child survived birth.
Other fields of the law have long since recognized that definite legal and equitable
rights inhere in the unborn infant. For example, the slaying of an unborn child that
has quickened in its mother's womb is manslaughter in New York; 3 in the law of
property, the unborn child is considered in esse for the purpose of taking a remainder
or an interest which is to its benefit 4 or of assuring a valid limitation of future estates.5
The child may bring an action for the wrongful death of its parent occurring prior
to birth; 6 it can be named an executor before it is born7 and, before birth, it may
obtain an injunction to stay waste 8 Precisely because this recognition of the unborn
child is considered a "legal fiction" designed principally, in the interests of justice,
to benefit the child and conform its status to firmly rooted concepts in property and
criminal law, courts have not been willing to extend the fiction to tort liability for
prenatal injuries when such an extension could in no way have blended with any of
the traditional principles of tort liability but, on the contrary, would have clashed
harshly with established concepts in the law of negligence.
Today however, concrete information regarding the viability of the foetus (i.e., the
capability of extra-uterine existence9 ) affords scientific support to the legal idealist
who would enlarge tort liability so as to include responsibility for prenatal injuries
and allow recovery to the child or its representative. The court in the principal case
2. The cases which have followed the Dietrich case and regarded it as precedent can
generally be placed in three categories: First, suits instituted by the administrator of the
child: Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 10 So. 566 (1926);
Newman v. Detroit, 281 Mich. 60, 274 N.W. 710 (1937); Buel v. United Ry., 248
Mo. 126, 154 S.W. 71 (1913); Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169, 49 At. 704 (1901);
Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W. 2d 944 (1935). Second,
suits where the infant was a viable foetus at the time of the injury but where recovery
was denied on the basis of the Dietricli case: Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359,
56 N.E. 638 (1900);

Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921);

Berlin v.

Penney et at., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28 (1940). Third, suits brought by the surviving infant
to recover for pre-natal injuries incurred before viability: Stemmer et a., v. Kline, 128
N. J. L. 455, 26 A. 2d 489 (1942); Lipps v. Milwaukee Ry., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N. W. 916
(1916). In all these cases, Justice Holmes' pronouncement was considered at least worthy
of attention though the facts in the Dietrich case demonstrate that the infant there was not
viable at the time it received its fatal injury.
3. N.Y. PxnAL LAw § 1050.
4. Stedfast v. Nicoll, 3 Johns. 18 (N. Y. 1802).
5. Long v. Blackall, 7 Durn. & E. 100 (K. B. 1812).
6. Quinlen v. Welch, 69 Hun. 584 (N.Y. 1893), aff'd, 141 N.Y. 158, 36 N.E. 12 (1894).
7. Ibid. See also Marsellis v. Thalhimer et al, 2 Paige 35 (N.Y. 1830).
8. Ibid. See also Jenkins v. Freyer, 4 Paige 47 (N.Y. 1833).
9. 2 WiTnous Aim BEcxER, M mcAL JrnisPRunLr'cn 522 (1940). A foetus is considered
viable at the time when, if delivery were necessary, it could survive birth. "While it is a
fact that there is a close dependence by the unborn child on the organism of its mother,
it is not disputed today that the mother and the child are two separate and distinct entities;
that the unborn child has its own system of circulation of the blood separate and apart
from the mother; that there is no connection between the two circulation systems; that
the heartbeat of the child is not in tune with that of the mother, but is more rapid; that
there is no dependence by the child on the mother except for sustenance." Stemmer et al. v.
Kline, 128 N.J. L. 455, 466, 26 A. 2d 489, 687 (1942) (dissent per Brogan, C. J.).
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could not have been unaware that legal precedent, no matter how solidified by tradition, has not always prevailed over compelling extra-legal concepts hostile to the
past; the usque ad coelum theory was forced to comprehend the airplane10 and the
"oneness" of the husband and wife did not survive post-Victorian sociology and the
emancipation of womanhood. 11
In the instant case, it is significant that the court's departure from the past was
not, itself, without precedent. As early as 1916, a Wisconsin court in Lipps v. Milwaukee Ry.,12 indicated that the fact of viability would have influenced a decision
which dismissed a suit brought on the grounds that the child was in fact not viable
at the time of the alleged negligence and did not survive the injury. And in 1946,
a Federal court in Bonbrest v. Kotz et al.,1 3 permitted an action by the child for prenatal injury caused by an alleged careless removal of the viable foetus from the
mother's womb on the theory that there was a legally cognizable distinction between
an embryo and a viable foetus. It is true that in the Boubrest case there was an
actual touching of the foetus by the defendant but the importance of that fact is
dimmed, if not extinguished, by the court's recognition of the fact that viability
alone conferred on the child a right to sue for his injury incurred while viable. The
Bonbrest case was a large14step away from the Dietrich case's rule, but there was a
"more poignant question"' which it suggested, i.e., will its new rule be extended to
include a case where it is the mother who is directly injured and where, as a consequence, the foetus is also harmed. The answer was given recently in Williams v.
Marion Rapid Transit Co.15 where the Ohio Supreme Court, basing its decision in
part on its interpretation of the word "person" in the state constitution as including
the viable foetus,'1 declared that as such the infant was a legal entity who had a
right after birth to maintain an action for the accident which allegedly caused the
horrible deformities which she must carry through life.
Thus, before the decision in the instant case, the Lipps, Boubrest and Williams
cases constituted a steady progression, however scattered, of American judicial opinion
away from the securely grounded lack of legal personality concept first enunciated
in the Dietrich case. It seems clear that the scientific determinability of viability
was the impetus for this deliberate departure from tradition. The decision in the
principal case takes a step even beyond the Williams case. Here, as a result of the
defendants' non-feasance, both the mother and the child died. The Minnesota court
allowed the administrator of the infant to maintain a cause of action for the latter's
wrongful death even though the foetus did not survive birth. The court thus removed
any possibility that it considered the child's survival, as in the Williams case, to be
a requisite to the maintenance of the action.
In these unborn child cases the problem is basically uncomplicated and the reasoning
behind the decisions naturally does not contemplate certain practical difficulties which
grow out of the resolution of the initial and purely legal problem of whether or not
10. See, for example, Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 F. 2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936).
11. See, for example, Oppenheim v. Kridel, 236 N.Y. 156, 140 N.E. 227 (1923).
12. 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916 (1916).
13. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D. D. C. 1946).
14. "The perhaps more poignant question remained whether recovery should be permitted
where there is proof of a negligent blow to the person of the pregnant mother of such
character and location as to cause injury to the viable unborn infant. . . ." 95 U. or PA. L.
R.v. 96 (1946).
15. 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E. 2d 334 (1949).
16. Id. at 117, 87 N. E. 2d at 335. Onxo CONSr. § 16, Art. I.
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the plaintiff had a cause of action. Nevertheless, because these difficulties are the
inevitable result of the holding in the Williams and principal cases and because their
consequent perplexities have often dissuaded legal minds from conferring a cause of
action for prenatal injuries to the unborn, yet viable child, it is wise to anticipate
some of them and briefly discuss their relation to the new cause of action.
First of all, it has been suggested that, if a right to sue is to be given the unborn
child, the instant of viability is an arbitrary and unsound point during pregnancy
at which to confer the right. These commentators contend that once the law admits
the right to sue before birth, it should go all the way and permit a suit for injuries
incurred at any time before birth.17 It is submitted, however, that to deny the right
to sue for injuries occurring before viability and to permit the cause of action for
injuries occurring afterward, is a logical distinction. Before viability the foetus has
no separate existence apart from its mother and an injury to it is actually an injury
to the mother. The impetus behind the decisions of the courts in Ohio and Iinnesota
was a scientific fact, not the legal fiction which spurs the law's recognition of certain
rights in the unborn child in criminal and property law. 8 The suggested enlargement
of the right to sue would find no support in the extra-legal basis of the decision in
the instant case and could hardly be grounded in the legal personality which is conferred on the unborn child by other fields of the law and which, as admitted fiction,
lacks the stability to combat the realities of negligence law.
It is obvious that the acceptance by the courts that the plaintiff, while still intutero,
is nevertheless a separate person does not necessarily mean that recovery will always
follow an injury allegedly caused by the negligent behavior of the defendant. The
infant still must prove that the defendant was chargeable with legal foresight of him
and it is entirely conceivable that in many cases this burden is unbearable. Nevertheless, in certain situations, e.g., where the defendant is a doctor as in the instant
case; where the act of the defendant is inherently dangerous without regard to specific persons; where the mother is known to be in the last stage of pregnancy, this
burden can be successfully carried. Generally, however, the issue as to whether the
unborn child is encompassed by the circuit of foresight chargeable to the defendant
is a matter to be decided only on the facts of each case.
Another difficulty which has occasionally been the principal deterrent to the viable
child's right of action is the problem of proof. 19 It may be stated generally that the
novelty of medical testimony necessary to prove viability and injury to the viable
child does not make the matters to be so proved any more difficult in presentation
or comprehension than other problems of causation which depend for their proof on
17. "The difficulty would seem to lie with that [viability] theory itself, which is too
broad in that it allows recovery in the Verkennes situation and too narrow in that It would
not aid a surviving child injured before viability. . . . It would seem wiser to avoid all
medico-metaphysical controversies as to when personality is to be accorded a foetus . . .
and to admit frankly that, regardless of theory and analogies, the fundamental reason for
allowing a surviving child a right of action for prenatal injuries is the injustice of denying
it." 63 HARv. L. lxv. 173, 174 (1949). "But if the reasons given above for investing the
unborn child with a legal personality are valid, this [viability] distinction is unsound, for
it should make no difference at what stage of embryonic development the foetus is when
injured." Comment, Legal Status of Infant En Ventre Sa Mere, 17 Cm. L. REv. 399, 397
(1950).
18. See notes 3-8 inclusive supra, and accompanying text.
19. An example of the cases where this difficulty had seemed insurmountable by the court
is Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935).
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competent and complicated medical testimony. The confusion of unfamiliar data and
the fear of embarrassing professional conflict in evidence have not dissuaded courts
in the past from entertaining suits which portend such problems. The suit for prenatal injuries by the child is hardly the place to succumb to such suasion.
Considering the background to the problem and prescinding from the consequent
difficulties herein noted, the really startling feature of the decision in the instant case
is the sixty five years which were consumed to arrive at it.

WILLs-DocTRINE o" DEPENDENT RELATrIvE REVoCATIO.-Testator executed a will
with due formality in July, 1910. When the will was found after testator's death, large
diagonal lines appeared over the written text extending through more than half of it,
and written diagonally through the text and also in the left margin wer6 the words
"See codicil". With the will was found an instrument, also in testator's handwriting,
dated in October, 1946, entitled "Codicil to my will", signed by testator and making
other dispositions of his property. The codicil was not executed with the formality
required by law. On appeal from an order granting judgment on the pleadings and
decreeing the admission of the will to probate, held, order affirmed on the ground that
by virtue of the application of either the doctrine of dependent relative revocation
or Section 34 of the Decedents Estate Law providing for revocation of wills the
conditional nature of the cancellation negatives an intent to revoke. Matter of Macomber, 274 App. Div. 724, 87 N.Y. S. 2d 308 (3d Dep't 1949).
The methods by which a testator may revoke his will in New York are prescribed
by statute,' and an attempted revocation which fails to meet the statutory requirements
is ineffective. 2 The statute has been interpreted as permitting partial revocation of a
will only by another writing which meets the requirements of the statute governing
the execution of wills. 3 If the revocation is by a physical act of4 the testator, it will be
ineffective unless it operates as a revocation of the entire will.
The principal ingredient of a revocation by physical act of the testator is the
intention to revoke.5 It has been held that actual words of revocation written across
the face of the instrument and signed by the testator are sufficient to constitute a valid
revocation under the statute.0 The courts have also held that, where a will is known

1. N. Y. DEc. EsT. LAW § 34: "No will in writing . . . nor any part thereof, shall be
revoked, or altered, otherwise than by some other will in writing, or some other writing of
the testator, declaring such revocation or alteration, and executed with the same formalities
with which the will itself was required by law to be executed; or unless such will be burnt,
torn, canceled, obliterated or destroyed, with the intent and for the purpose of revoking the
same ....
" (Italics supplied).
2. Matter of Tremain, 282 N. Y. 485, 27 N. E. 2d 19 (1940); In re Berman's Will,
185 Misc. 1037, 58 N. Y. S. 2d 512 (Surr. Ct. 1945); In re Semler's Will, 176 Misc. 687,
28 N. Y. S. 2d 390 (Surr. Ct. 1941).
3. In re Griffith's Will, 167 Misc. 366, 3 N. Y. S. 2d 925 (Surr. Ct. 1938); Matter of
Hildenbrand, 87 Misc. 471, 150 N. Y. Supp. 1067 (Surr. Ct. 1914).
4. Revocation of a will "must be 'all or nothing' except by codicil." In re Lyons' Will,
75 N. Y. S. 2d 237, 243 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
5. Matter of Lloyd, 166 App. Div. 1, 151 N. Y. Supp. 459 (1st Dep't 1915); Matter of
Crawford, 80 Misc. 615, 142 N. Y. Supp. 1032 (Surr. Ct. 1913).
6. Matter of Parsons, 204 App. Div. 879, 197 N. Y. Supp. 935 (2d Dep't 1922), afJ'd
mem., 236 N. Y. 580, 142 N. E. 291 (1923).
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to have been in testator's possession and cannot be found after his death, there is a
presumption that the will was destroyed with an intention to revoke and that this presumption will prevail unless rebutted by proof to the contrary.7 Thus, in order to
prove a revocation by a physical act of the testator, either the intention to revoke must
be expressed by the testator, either the intention to revoke must be expressed by the
testator or it must appear that the act of destruction must have been done with such
an intention.
The principal case again raises the question of the applicability in New York of the
doctrine of dependent relative revocation that is valid on its face when the testators
intention to revoke is conditioned upon an intention to leave another wilL This doctrine which originated in England 8 and which has been adopted in a number of jurisdictions in the United States,9 is said to have been first expressed in 1788 when it was
defined as follows: "This principle, that the effect of the obliteration, cancelling, etc.,
depends upon the mind with which it is done, having been pursued in all its consequences, has introduced another distinction not yet taken notice of; namely, that
of dependent relative revocations, in which the act of cancelling, etc., being done with
will be a revocation or
reference to another act meant to be an effectual disposition,
°
V
not, according as the relative act is efficacious or not."
There are four factual situations in which the courts have invoked the
doctrine: (1) Testator destroys his will in the belief that he thereby revives
a prior will.'
The attempted revival fails to meet the statutory requirements governing the revival of a prior will by revocation of a later will but
the courts, in jurisdictions where the doctrine is recognized, have held that
the revocation depends for its validity upon the effectiveness of the attempt to
revive the prior will and that, since the revival is ineffective, the revocation is also
inoperative. The application of the doctrine will not be warranted by showing merely
that, in addition to the intention to yevoke, the testator also intended to revive a prior
will. It must also appear that, if he had known that the revival was ineffective, he
would have preferred his estate to pass by the later will.12 If it appears that, regardless of the effect of the attempted revival, the testator intended to revoke the later
will, then the doctrine will not be applied and the revocation v.i be permitted to
stand. (2) Testator revokes his will with the intention of making another wil but
dies before accomplishing this or the new document is ineffective for lack of due execution or other cause. 13 The doctrine has no application where the sole "revocation" of
the will is by another instrument in writing which is ineffective for want of due execution. In the majority of jurisdictions an instrument in writing, in order to be effective
as a revocation, must be executed with all the formalities with which the will itself
was required to be executed. If, then, the revoking instrument is not duly executed
it is totally inoperative as a revocation and the question of testator's intention does
not arise. The doctrine has been applied, however, where the revoking instrument is
7. Matter of Staiger, 243 N. Y. 468, 154 N. E. 312 (1926); In re Schmidt's Estate, 63
N. Y. S. 2d 809 (Surr. Ct. 1946); In re Beckerle's Will, 46 N. Y. S. 2d 271 (Surr. Ct 1943).
8. Onions v. Tyrer, 1 P. Wins. 343, 24 Eng. Rep. 418 (1716) ; Powell v. Powell, L. R. 1
P &D 209 (1866).
9. "It is so generally adopted that it is recognized as a part of our law without further
discussion.' Sanderson v. Norcross, 242 Mass. 43, 45, 136 N. E. 170, 171 (1922).
10. PowErL, Drmss 637 (1st ed. 1788).
11. Powell v. Powell, L. R. 1 P. & D. 209 (1866).
12. In re Callahan's Estate, 251 Wis. 247, 29 N. W. 2d 352 (1945).
13. Dixon v. Treasury Solicitor, (1905) P.D. 42.
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ineffective, not because of a defect in execution but by reason of a circumstance dehors
the will, 1 4 as, for example, the inability of the legatee to take under the will. (3)
Testator deletes portions of his will and interlines new matter which is of no effect
since it is unsigned or unwitnessed.' 6 The doctrine would not apply to this situation
in New York since, under the statute, there can be no partial revocation by obliteration.
(4) Testator is induced to revoke his will by a mistaken belief as to a fact or a point
of law. 16 In some cases, the courts have denied effect to the revocation on the ground
that the intention to revoke is conditioned on the truth of the belief which induces
the testator to revoke his will. 17 Other authorities hold that the intent to revoke
in such a case is absolute but that relief, if it is to be granted at all, should be granted
on the ground of mistake. 18 The latter would seem to be the sounder view since, In
such cases, the testator revokes his will not on the condition that his belief is true but
because he believes it to be true.
A study of the cases in which the doctrine has been invoked would seem to show
that the primary requisite to its application is a valid and effective revocation. If the
attempted revocation does not meet the statutory requirements, it is totally ineffective and there is no need to consider whether or not the revocatory intent was
conditional. If, by applying the statute, it is determined that there is an effective
revocation, the courts in jurisdictions in which the doctrine is recognized then decide
what the wishes of the testator would have been if he had known that the will, which
he attempted to substitute in place of the revoked will, was ineffective. If it appears
that a declaration of intestacy would be more likely to effectuate the testator's Intention, then the doctrine is not applied and the revocation is permitted to stand.' 0
But if, from the circumstances and from the statements of the testator, it appears
that he would have preferred his estate to pass by the first will rather than by
intestacy, the doctrine is applied, the revocation is denied effect and the revoked will
is admitted to probate. 20
The ultimate test, then, of the application of'the doctrine is the intention of the
testator. It is not sufficient that, along with the intention to revoke, the testator have
an intention to make another will at some indefinite future date. 2 1 The revocation
must be performed 'With a present intention to set up another testamentary disposition,
with the revocation dependent upon the validity of the subsequent disposition, i.e., it
must appear that, if the testator had known that the new will was ineffective, he
14. In re Kaufman's Estate, 25 Cal. 2d 854, 155 P. 2d 831 (1945); Blackford v.
Anderson, 226 Iowa 1138, 286 N. W. 735 (1939).

15. Schneider v. Harrington, 320 Mass. 723, 71 N. E. 2d 242 (1947).
ated a bequest contained in her will. The Massachusetts statute permits
by obliteration but the court, applying the doctrine of dependent relative
effect to the revocation and admitted the will to probate in its original
16. Adams v. Southerden, (1925) P.D. 177; Doe d. Evans v. Evans,

Testatrix obliterpartial revocation
revocation, denied
form.
10 Ad. & E. 228,

113 Eng. Rep. 88 (1839).

17.
18.

Ibid.
Warren, Dependent Relative Revocation, 33 HAiv. L. REv. 337, 350 (1920).

19. In the Estate of Zimmer, 40 T. L. R. 502 (1924); In re Houghton's Estate, 310
Mich. 613, 17 N. W. 2d 774 (1945).

20. Stewart v. Johnson, 142 Fla. 425, 194 So. 869 (1940); Charleston Library Society
et al. v. Citizens & Southern Nat. Bank et al., 200 S. C. 96, 20 S. E. 2d 623 (1942); Dixon
v. Treasury Solicitor, (1905) P.D. 42.
21. McIntyre v. McIntyre, 120 Ga. 67, 47 S. E. 501 (1904); In Ye Bonkowski's Estate,
266 Mich. 112, 253 N. W. 235 (1934).
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would have preferred that his estate pass by the old will.2
In the principal case, the court came to the conclusion that "the facts here fit well
within the classic pattern of the rule in its most reliable aspect, and it ought to be
applied to the facts of this case.i'as This interpretation of the facts is questionable.
As stated above, a revocation of a will by cancellation is effective only if it operates
to revoke the entire will It has been held that the canceling of testator's signature
is of itself sufficient to constitute a valid revocation.2- It has also been held that
express words of revocation written across the face of the instrument and signed by
the testator will have the same effect.a In the principal case, however, the marks of
cancellation covered only half of the written text and the only words written across
the face of the instrument were "See codicil". Rather than showing an intention to
revoke the will in its entirety, these words would seem to evince an intention merely
to alter the will. If this is the true construction, the attempted revocation would
not meet with the requirements of Section 34 of the Decedent's Estate Law and
the will would be admitted to probate in its original form without reference to the
doctrine of dependent relative revocation. If, on the other hand, the acts by which
testator attempted to revoke his will were sufficient to meet the statutory requirements, the doctrine could be applied on the ground that the revocation was conditioned on the setting up of another testamentary disposition and that, since the
attempted substitution was ineffective, the revocation was also inoperativeF 0
Assuming that testator's acts were sufficient to meet the statutory requirements
for revocation, the court's application of the doctrine in the principal case is in conflict with the conclusion arrived at by Surrogate Foley in Matter of McCaffrey. In that case, the testator obliterated the entire second page of his will including his
signature and those of the witnesses. There was unquestionably an intention to revoke and under the facts as so far stated there was a valid revocation under Section
34 of the Decedent's Estate Law. However, at the foot of the page, there was a
notation signed by the testator and admittedly in his handwriting to the effect that
his intention in cancelling the will was to restore a prior will to full force and effect.
The Surrogate held that, in spite of this notation, the testator's act was a complete
revocation under the statutory procedure and that it effectively destroyed the will.
He also concluded that, since "the history of our statutes, the decisions and our
public policy exclude the existence of the doctrine of dependent relative revocation
'
as a rule of law in this state"2
the doctrine could not be invoked in order to deny
effect to a revocation which met with all the statutory requirements. This view was
adopted in Matter of Fie/dP9 in which the Surrogate refused to apply the doctrine on
the basis of the statement in the MeCaifrey case.
22. In re Houghton's Estate, 310 Mich. 613, 17 N. W. 2d 774 (1945); In the Estate of
Zimmer, 40 T. L. R. 502 (1924).
23. Matter of Macomber, 274 App. Div. 724, 728, 87 N. Y. S. 2d 305, 312 (3d Dep't
1949).
24. Matter of McCaffrey, 174 Misc. 162, 20 N. Y. S. 2d 178 (Surr. Ct. 1940).
25. Matter of Parsons, 204 App. Div. 879, 197 N. Y. Supp. 935 (2d Dep't 1922), afj'd
mem., 236 N. Y. 580, 142 N. E. 291 (1923).
26. Under this construction of the facts, the principal case would fall within the second
of the four categories set forth above into which the cases applying the doctrine have
been divided.
27. 174 Misc. 162, 20 N. Y. S. 2d 178 (Surr. Ct. 1940).
28. Id. at 173, 20 N. Y. S. 2d at 189.
29. 194 Misc. 47, 84 N. Y. S. 2d 886 (Surr. Ct. 1948).
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It is submitted, however, that the history of the decisions in New York prior to
the McCaffrey case does not exclude the existence of the doctrine. On the contrary,
in those cases in which the doctrine was considered, it received only favorable
mention. 30
The statute presents no bar to the application of the doctrine because, where the
revocation is by physical act of the testator, the statute requires that the act be
performed "with an intention to revoke". No mention is made as to whether an
absolute intention is essential or whether a conditional intention will fulfill the
requirement. In the principal case, the court said that "the conditional nature of the
... "31 If these words are taken
cancellation here negatives an intent to revoke .
at their face value, the conclusion is inevitable that the attempted revocation was
totally ineffective and there would be no need to invoke the doctrine. If, however,
they may be interpreted as holding that the revocatory intent is conditional, then
the court would seem to be interpreting the statute as requiring an absolute intention
to revoke. Under this interpretation, it would seem that the court is attempting to
incorporate the doctrine into the statute and deny effect to a revocation when it appears that it was done for the purpose of making another testamentary disposition.
Since the doctrine calls for an interpretation of the intention of a dead person, it
should be applied with caution.32 It is submitted, however, that a recognition of
the fact that the intention with which a testator revokes his will is not always absolute would give greater effect to the wishes of testators than does the strict interpretation of the statute which is recommended in Matter oj McCaffrey.
30. See Ely v. Megie, 219 N. Y. 112, 113 N. E. 800 (1916). Testator, by a codicil,
made proponent, a charitable institution, a residuary legatee. By a later codicil, revoking
the residuary clause, proponent was given a specific bequest. This bequest was invalid
because of a statutory provision that a will containing a bequest to a charitable corporation must be executed within a certain period prior to testator's death. The court held.
that since "the gift . . . failed not by reason of any defect in the instrument, but solely
in consequence of matter dehors the instrument," the doctrine could not be applied to revive
the earlier bequest. Id. at 139, 113 N. E. at 807. See also Matter of Ralsbeck, 52 Misc.
279, 102 N. Y. Supp. 967 (Surr. Ct. 1906): A holographic will written in ink was found
after testator's death with a number of interlineations and obliterations in pencil thereon.
The court said that "the circumstances would seem to justify the application of the rule
of dependent relative revocation established by the English authorities," alid the will was
admitted to probate in its original form. Id. at 283, 102 N. Y. Supp. at 970.
31. Matter of Macomber, 274 App. Div. 724, 728, 87 N. Y. S. 2d 308, 312 (3d Dep't 1949).
32. Sanderson v. Norcross, 242 Mass. 43, 136 N. E. 170 (1922).

